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RATIONALE FOR FINANCIAT SYSTEM
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION:
A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
Some economists, on the one
hond, orgue thot stricter finonciol
regulotion ond supervision con
prevent the occunence of morkel
foilures (e.9. Diomond ond
Dybvig, 1983; Stiglitz, 1994) ond
promote economic developmenl
(e.g White, 2005) while others

aL,

odvocote the notion of

selfregulotion of morkets. i.e ollowing
the invisible forces of demond ond
supply to regulote morkets (e.g
Stigler. 1970). Mony believe thol
the occurence of the recent
finonciol crisis wos premised on the
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o significont sociol ond economic
cost on society. These costs
include: (l) the fiscol costs of

compensoting

depositors/investors (e.g deposit
insuronce protection fund), (ii) the
costs of recopitolizing foiled bonks
ond (iii) output losses thot occur
due to overoll disruption to the
economy. The close up of foctories
ond businesses, ond the ottendont
job losses resulted to collopse of

internotionol trode,

etc

ore

exomples of the spill over effecls of
o typicol finonciol crisis. There is o

lotter view of 'light hond' view thot the frequency ond
of morkets, o view severity of finonciol crises ore

regulotion
INTRODUCTION

cloimed to hove been supported
by the ex-Fed Choirmon, Alon
Greenspon which led to the
lowering of interest rotes in U.S
below sustoinoble levels. Those in

increosing; so there is no cose for
leoving morket forces to operote
freely. Public toleronce of finonciol
loss is olso diminishing.

interest" orgument while those

the presence of morket foilures but

o
"privote interest" view. The Public-

locks the incentives ond

Tn" finonciol system of ony
I economv consists of finonciol fovour of regulotion ond
I intermediories (bonks, ond supervision present o "publicnon-bonks), finonciol morkets (e.g

money ond copitol morkets),
finonciol instruments (sovings,
loons ond securities) ond the users

of finonciol services (households,
firms, governments, investors,
troders, ond other morket

ogoinst regulotion present

lnterest view orgues thot the

presence of osymmetric

informotion in finonciol morkets,
which leod to morket foilures,

porticiponts). The finonciol system
ploys o key role in the economy by

justifies the role of government os
the ultimote insurer of the finonciol

intermediotion, which involves the
mobilizotion ond ollocotion of

system. Morket foilures disrupt
copitol formotion through the
finonciol intermediotion role of

investment. A stoble finonciol
system is olso importont for the
efficient functioning of the

institutions os mentioned eorlier.
Contogion theory teoches thot

focilitoting

finonciol

resources for productive

poyments system, thereby
occeleroting the process of
finonciol deepening between the
finonciol ond reol sectors of the
economy.
Sometimes. however, when the

finonciol system foils

or

molfunctions, it could pose severe
problems for the whole economy.

bonks ond other finonciol

the foilure of o

bonking

intermediory con spill overto other

neighbouring bonks thereby
threotening the entire finonciol
system (e.9. Diomond ond Dvbvig,
r e83).
The foilure of o bonk con leod to o

loss of copitol for in excess of
shoreholders' investmenl. lt inflicts

On the other hond, the privote
interest view of regulotion odmits
contends thot the government

copobilities to omeliorote these
morket foilures. Proponents of this
view hove viewed regulotion os o
product. like mony other products.
which ore offected by supply ond
demond forces (Borth, Coprio ond
Levine, 2006). Moreover, orthodox
economic theory teoches thot
morket forces produce the optimol
ollocotion of resources so thot the
workings of the morket con be
deemed efficient. The privote
interest view hos been described

os the cose of "regulotory
copture" or "politicol copture" (os
the cose moy be) ond in this cose
represents o situotion where
bonking policies ore primorily
shoped by the privote interests of
the regulotor, privote bonkers or
politicions, rother thon by the
public interest.

'7he views e)qcressedin fhispoperore fhose of fheouthoronddo nof represenf theoffi'ciolposiibn of fheCenholEonk
of Nigenb orits Boord of Dfrecfors.
' victor Ekpu is the Director of Reseorch & Policy Development ot Mindsef Resource Consulfing, Glosgow, UK I Emoil:

vicfor.ekpu@mrndsefrc. co. uk I Tel: +4 (0) 791 7 33 33, I
'Regulotbnsefsouf lhe generolrules underwtrichotftciollyoufhorisedfnonciofuhsfifutrbns ondrnorkehmusf operote.
tSupervrbrbn
enloils fhe moniforingondenforcement of complionce wffh theprovisions ofregulolion.
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For exomple, the view believes
thot government regulotes bonks
to focilitote the finoncing of
government expenditures, to

chonnel credit

to

politicolly

ottroctive projects of lhe expense
of economicolly etficient ones.
Proponents of this view orgue thot

even when oll regulotory
opporotuses ore present,

supervisory powers ore limited ond

often politicised. Thus they support
the view of greoter relionce on

'morket discipline'.'informotion
disclosure', o 'light hond' by the
regulotory outhorities, ond o
greoter oversight on the

regulotory process itself (Shleifer,
2005 cited in Borth et ol, 2006). But
recenl crisis episodes prove this
view to be inodequote. The depth
ond mognitude of the recent
globol crisis proved thot the
regulotory opprooch wos lox ond
ineffective in onticipoting shocK.

ln essence, the shortcomings of

regulotion ond supervision,

notwithstonding, one con orgue
thot becouse of the speciol role
thot finonciol institutions ploy in the
economy ond the economic ond
sociol costs to society of their
eventuol foilure, it is obvious thot
leoving the forces of demond ond
supply to beor rule will hove
odverse implicotions on the
economy ond the living stondords
of the notion's citizens. lt is on this
note thot lexpound on the vorious
reosons for finonciol system
regulotion in seclion 2. The poper

in section 3 with some
conclusions ond policy
ends

implicotions.

2. SO WHY REGULATE

THE

FINANCIAL SYSTEM?

A vost omount of economic ond
commerciol octivities ore now

being reguloted ond/or

supervised which shows the
ond the
of

price mechonism to produce finonciol sector thus reduces the
sociolly desiroble outcomes. For cost ond risk of inveslmenl ond of
exomple, food ond drugs must be producing ond troding in goods
heolthy ond sofe for consumers; ond services (Herring ond
the lronsport ond oviotion Sontomero,19991.|n view of these
industries ore now subject to conlributions to economic
stringent sofety stondords; there performonce, mointoining o
ore now price controls on mony heolthy finonciol sector through
products ond services in order to effective regulotion ond
prevent lorge firms from moking supervision should be of
huge monopoly profits. So it is poromounf interest to the centrol
obvious thol the provision of bonk ond other relevont
finonciol products musl follow the stokeholders.
some strict regulotion. But on
orgument con be roised here, 2.2. Prolecling Consumers ond
which is thot finonciol institutions
Deposilors
ore speciol ond hence demond
speciol regulotory ottention. While A second fundomentol rotionole
it is permissible for firms in some of for finonciol regulotion is the
these industries (e.g clothes, food protection of consumers ogoinst
ond trovel) to go bust if they the excessive pricing or
mismonoge their offoirs, it might opportunistic behoviour by
not be sociolly or even politicolly providers of finonciol services or
occeptoble for bonks ond other porticiponts in finonciol morkets.
finonciol institutions (e.g insuronce According to Molhews ond
firms, pension funds, ond Thompson (2008), consumers lock
investment firms) to become morket power ond ore prone to
insolvent. There ore thus severol exploitotion from the monopolistic
reosons for reguloting the finonciol behoviour of bonks. Bonk ore
services sector:
somewhot oble to exploit the
informotion lhey hove obout their
2.1. The lmportonce of Finonciol clienls to exercise some
lntermediolion
monopolistic pricing of finonciol
products. However, the more
Finonciol institutions, especiolly competitive finonciol morkets ore
bonks ore essentiolto the efficient the lesser this degree of
functioning of the economy. As exploilotion. For exomple, the
mentioned eorlier, they ploy strong competition in the bonking
distinct role in the finonciol morkel con leod to o decline in
intermediotion process. Bonks interest morgins. However, the
issue deposits, originote loons, ond poinl is lhot consumers of finonciol
provide poyment services. By services- especiolly the
focilitoting tronsoctions, mobilising unsophisticoted ones ore unoble
sovings ond ollocoting copitol to evoluote the quolity of finonciol
ocross lime ond spoce, the informotion or services thot they
finonciol system contributes to controct. Under such
economic performonce. Finonciol circumstonces, consumers ore
institutions provide poyment vulneroble to odverse selection,
services ond o voriety of finonciol the likelihood thot o customer will
products ond services thot enoble choose on incompetenl or
the corporote sector ond dishonest firm for investmenl or
households to cope with ogent for execution of o
economic uncertointies by tronsoction. They ore olso
hedging, pooling, shoring ond vulneroble to morol hozord, the
lhot firms or
will
risk. A stoble efficient

'Ihe ybwse{cressedrn fhbpoperore fhoseof fhe outhoronddo notrepresenf fhe olficlalpositionof theCenlrolbnk
of Nigerio orifs Boord of Direcfoa.
Vrctor Ekpu is the Dhecfor of Reseorch & Polby Development ot Mindsel Resource Consvlting. Glosgow, UK
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ploce their own interests or those
of onother customer obove those
of the customeroreven engoge in
froud. ln short, unsophisticoted

the provision by outhorities of

'incompetence','negligence' ond
'froud' (Hening ond Sontomero,
19991. The strict enforcement of
conduct of business rules with

2.3.

customers ore prone to

oppropriote sonctions for
misbehoviour con help deter
finonciol institutions from exploiting

osymmetric informotion ogoinst
unsophisticoted customers.

Aport from protecting consumers
from the opportunistic behoviour
of finonciol institutions, depositors
thotore uninformed ond unobleto

monitor bonks olso require

protection. There is o notion thot
uninsured depositors ore likely to

run rolher thon monitor

(lbid).
exomple, most

Historicolly, for
bonk foilures in the US were
coused by bonk ponics. ln focl, it
wos in response to the bonking
crisis of the Greot Depression thot
the U.S estoblished the Federol
Deposit lnsuronce Corporotion
(FDIC) in 1933 to ossist in providing
deposit insuronce ogoinst loss of
owners of smoll deposits.

Mony countries over the

explicit deposit insuronce. The
orgument thot uninsured
depositors ore likely to couse o
bonk run is olso theoreticolly
motivoted. The most influentiol
work in the oreo of preventing
bonk runs is the onolysis by
Diomond ond Dybvig. (1983). The
model presupposes thot, in the

cose of on undesiroble
equilibrium, o bonk run con

of other
supposedly solvent bonks
precipitote the foilure

becouse the foilure of one bonk
couses depositors to ponic ond
rush to the bonk to withdrow their
deposits becouse they expect
other bonks to foil. ln orderto solve
this problem, the model proposes

the suspension of deposit

convertibility (deposit freeze) ond
See Mofhews

Enhoncing Efficiency of

lhe FinonciolSyslem

Aport from protecting consumers

from monopolistic pricing,

finonciol regulotion olso oims ot
hornessing morket forces to
enhonce the efficiency of the
ollocotion within the finonciol
sector ond between the finonciol
sector ond the rest of the
economy. ln the U.S. competition
policy ond ontiirust enforcement
ore the key tools for enhoncing the
efficiency of the finonciol system.
The moin emphosis here is lo

minimise the monopolistic
tendencies of bonks ond the
boniers to entry into the finonciol
services industry. One of the
chorocteristics of on efficient
bonking system is one. which
provides quolity service to
customers of competitive prices.
An efficient finonciolsystem

chorocterised by

o

is

olso

relioble

poyment system, high liquidity ond
low tronsoction costs. The purpose

of regulotion is thus to promote
yeors

hove estoblished similor systems of

r

o
to
oct
scheme
insuronce
deposit
os o disincentive to porticipote in o
bonkrun.

incentives omong firms.

The
efficient operotion of the finonciol
morkets depend criticolly on
confidence thot finonciol morkets
ond institutions operote occording
to the rules ond procedures thot
ore foir, lronsporent ond ploce
customers' interest first. An efficient
finonciol system will stimulote

competition, which olso

encouroges innovotion omongst
finonciol institutions ond leods to
the development of new ond
better finonciol services for
customers.

2.1.

Keeping up wilh lhe Poce

of Finonciol lnnovotion

At the root of finonciol instobility

is

the drive towords finonciol
innovotion by finonciol institutions
ond investors. As finonciol morkets
develop ond expond globolly ond
os new products ond instruments
evolve doily in line with chonges in
technology ond the globolizotion
of finonciol services, there hove
been significont concerns overthe
obility of regulotors ond supervisors
lo keep up with the complexity of
products ond morkets. Bonks seek
to exploit profitoble opportunities

by innovoting new morket

efficiency ond competition in the
finonciol system. Efficiency ond

ond products thot
would generote substontiol
returns, yet ore highly risky.

intertwined. An efficient finonciol
system is oble to utilise or ollocote
its investors'resources prudently if it
will continue to ottroct their

Regulotion ond supervision hove

competition ore closely

potronoge. Without

such
competition, individuol bonks
might wont to goin higher prices

for their products/services

or
collude with other bonks (Spong,
2000). Some firms moy wont to
toke undue odvontoge of the
relotive ignoronce of customers to
boostprofits.

instruments

hod to odjust occordingly. The
onolysis of risk, in porticulor, ond
the omount of copitol ond liquidity

necessory to motch this new
understonding of risk, hos
developed significontly. For
exomple, the recent globol
finonciol crisis which wos

preceded bythe odoption of new
business models bosed on
wholesole (non-stoble) funding,

derivotives troding ond
of ossets hove

securitizotion
The purpose of regulotion

is

thus to

use oppropriote conduct of
business rules, disclosure stondords

ond conflicts of interest rules to
guord ogoinst unwholesome
proctices ond conect perverse

ond lhompson (2008 : I 89- I %l for exomp,es.

20

elicited oppropriote response by
regulotors ond supervisors. The
Bosel Committee on Bonking
Supervision (BCBS) hos recently
mode chonges to the Bosel ll
fromework, which wos deemed to
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be procyclicol, ond

micro-

prudentiol focused. The new
regulotory fromework is now
termed the Bosel lll. Bosel lll

strengthens bonk copitol

requirements ond introduces new
regulotory requirements on bonk
liquidity ond bonk leveroge.

ln o world of increosing finonciol
innovotion, it is chollenging for
regulotion ond supervision to

effectively prevent the frogility
ossocioted with o liberolized
(morket) system. Finonciol
liberolizolion often leods to
optimism ond euphorio. Under
such environment, risks ore
downployed ond incorrectly

ossessed. Limits

on credit

exponsion or concentrotion moy

not be eosily enforceoble. lts
misfortunes, notwithstonding,
finonciol innovotion motlers for
economic growth ond ollocotion
of copitol. Becouse of this, it is
somewhot difficult ond costly to
regulote finonciol innovotion
(Engelen et ol, 2009). lf finonciol
innovotion connot be stopped, it
con be mode less ottroctive
through vorious meosures such os:

(i) Product testing i.e
investigoting the suitobility of
finonciol instruments or products
ond how they will be used. (ii)
Disclosure rules - improving
tronsporency ond informotion
exchonge in the morket. These
meosures will perhops ossist
regulotors, investors ond other
morket porticiponts in ossessing
the risk profile of institutions ond
theirexposures.

2.2. Guording Agoinst
Systemic

Risk

ond Contogion

The systemic risk rotionole for
prudentiol regulotion ond
supervision of bonks begins from
the understonding thot bonks ore

highly leveroged institutions (with

on equity-to-osset rotio thol

is

lower thon other finonciol ond
non-finonciol firms) ond hold
portfolios of illiquid ossets thot ore
difficult to volue. Bonks tronsform
short term ond liquid demond ond
sovings deposits inlo the longer
term, risky, ond illiquid cloims on
borrowers. Shocks occur in o
finonciol system where there is o
breokdown in this moturity
tronsformotion upon which bonks
depend for their profitobility. Such
shocks thot originote f rom
finonciol institutions' inobility to
redeem of short notice the
deposits thot fund longer term
illiquid loons con give rise to
instobility in the finonciolsystem. A
systemic risk is thus creoted where
the risk of o sudden, unonticipoted
event in the finonciol syslem
disrupts the efficient ollocotion of

resources ond thus f rustrotes
economic octivity. According to o
publicotion by the lMF,

FSB

ond

BIS

(2009), systemic risk con be
defined os the risk of disruption to
the provision of finonciol services
(such os credit, poyment ond
insuronce services) thot orises
through the impoirment of oll or
ports of the finonciol system, ond

foilure orweokness of on individuol
f

inonciol institution on other

finonciol institutions, which
potentiolly disrupts the flow of
finonciolservices to the economy
ot lorge. According to Nier (201l).
this kind of disruption con occur

through four chonnels of
conlogion: (i) direct exposures
ond contogion losses of other

finonciol instiiutions (ii) relionce of
other finonciol institutions on the
continued provision of finonciol
services - such os credit ond

poyment services

- by the

distressed institution (iii) fire-soles of
ossets by the distressed institution

thot couse mork-to-morket losses
ot other institutions, ond (iv)
informotionol contogion thot
sporks off o loss of confidence in
other institutions. Addressing the
cross sectionol dimension of
systemic risk colls for the
colibrotion of prudentiol tools with

respect to the systemic

significonce of individuol
institutions viz-o-viz their
contribution to overoll risk. For
instonce, those institutions thot
pose o greoteromountof systemic
risk would be subject to tighter
stondords (Clement,

20 I 0).

to creote o
moteriolodverse effect on the reol

The time dimension of systemic risk,

risk

policies ore oimed ot limiting the
of such disruptions to the
provision of finonciol services to
the reoleconomy.

thot orise from the oggregole
weokness of the finonciol sector

The Bonk for lnternotionol

reol
economy. This kind of disruption
orises when risk is distributed within
the finonciol system ot once. lt

hos the potentiol

economy. Mocro-prudentiol

Settlements (BlS) hos clossified
systemic risk into two dimensions:
(i) the'cross-sectionol' dimension
(or micro-systemic dimension) of
systemic risk ond (ii) the 'time'
dimension (or the mocro-systemic
dimension). The cross sectionol
dimension refers to the disruptions
thot orise from the effect of the

on the other hond, refers to
disruptions of finonciol services

ond its effect on the

occurs becouse finonciol
institutions ore f oced with

common exposures or coneloted
risks, e.g. correloted credit risk,
common exposure to morket risksincluding chonges to stock morket
prices, exchonge rotes, etc - os
well os common exposure to the
dry up of liquidity in funding

this proctbe b common todoy in developed finonciol cenrres ond much less in develo5ling counfn'es where the clossb fomr of
commerciol bonling still prevoib. ln Nigen'o, however, bonk hove since 2001 odopted the universol bonh'ng fromewok which ollows
bonking instlufibns to own other non-bonk infermedlon'es ike insuronce componies, pension funds, ond invesfmenl bonking
subslUion'es. Ihis orongemenf creofed huge trcnslet ond inlerconnecfion of niks ocross fhese subsidiodes, especiorly in the copttol
morkelsegment, which portty occounted for the 20O*bonhng cdsis in Nigen'o.
'seehnkfortnfemofionolsetllemenB (2010) formore on Boselllenhoncemenh ffhe newBoselttf .
' According fo the FSA s Ium er Reporl (200f) for the UK bon ks, product regulofron is nof requi'ed becous e wellmonoged fmrs will not
developgoducfs Mrich ore excessivelyrisky, ondbecouse wellinformedcustomerswlllonty chooseproducfs whichsenze theineeds.
'Kodres ond Noroin (20091suggesf fholmodebondvoluofibn fechnQues used bybonbshould be disclrsed fo olirwinvesfors beffer
judge fhe risb of whol they ue confrochhg.

'
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morkets. Since there ore
correlotions or interconnections
ocross institutions, crystollisotion of
these risks puts pressure on oll or o

lorge proportion of providers of

finonciol services to the economy
(Nier.201l). The time dimension of
systemic risk loter become known
os the 'procyclicolity' of the
f inonciol system. Addressing

procyclicolity colls for the
prudentiol fromework thot induces
lhe build-up of cushions in good
times so thot they could be drown

down in bod times (i.e
countercyclicol copitol buffers),

thereby octing os stobilisers

cost on society. These costs
include: (l) the fiscol costs of

compensoting

depositors/investors (e.g deposit
insuronce protection fund), (ii) the
costs of recopitolizing foiled bonks
ond (iii) output losses thot occur
due to overqll disruption to the
economy. For exomple, the close
up of foctories ond businesses, job
losses creoted, collopse in externol
trode, etc ore oll spill over effects
of o typicolfinonciol crisis. ln foct,
the fiscol costs of bonking crises
ond other costs ossocioted with
crisis monogement over the yeors,

occording

lo o recent crises

2.1. Miligoting Exlernolilies from

dotobose hover between 13.3%
ond 5l .1% of GDP, with output
losses overoging obout 20% of

Finonciol Syslem Foilure

GDP during the first 4 yeors of crisis

(Clement,2010).

When finonciol institutions foil ond

morkets dry up, they connot

(Loeven ond Volencio, 2008). Thus
unreguloted privote octions con
pose substontiol costs to the reol
economy in mony respects.

perform their essentiol functions of
chonnelling funds to lhose offering
the most productive investment
opportunities. Some firms moy lose
occess to credit. lnvestment
spending moysufferin both quolity

2.'1. Finonclol lnstilulions' Access
lo the Public Sofety Net

offects the poyments system. the

window when they foce

consumption directly. The feor of
such outcomes is whot motivotes
policy mokers to oct. Moreover,
there is o significont divergence
between the privole morginol
costs ond the sociqlmorginolcosts
of finonciol system foilure. While
the privote morginol costs of
foilure (e.g destroyed shoreholder
volue, lost jobs ond domoged
reputotions) ore borne by the
shoreholders ond the employees
of the compony, the potentiol
externol (sociol morginol) costs for

lemporory liquidity constroints or
the lender of lost resort (LOLR)
focilities when they ore unoble to
occess funds from the interbonk
morket (os the cose moy be).
Nowodoys, investment bonks ond
insuronce firms (in the U.S for
exomple) hove occess to the
public sofety net. Thus. it is
imperotive for centrol bonks to
monitor ond supervise how these
institulions deploy such funds. As
stoted eorlier. in order to eliminote
bonk runs ond insulote the
finonciol system from odverse

ond quontity. lf the domoge

shock moy olso dompen

Commerciol bonks hove occess
to the centrol bonk's discount

in

shocks, most notionol

mognilude. ln this light lherefore, it
con be orgued thot the foilure of
on institution con leod to o loss of

Although, the public sofety net hos

outstrip these privote costs

copitol for in excess of

shoreholders' investment. lt inflicts
o significont sociol ond economic

governments hove instituted
deposit insuronce schemes.

drowbocks. Becouse with o sofety
net,. depositors know thot they will
not suffer losses if o bonk foils, they
do not hove incentives to monitor
the bonk when they suspect thot
the bonk is toking on too much risk.
Consequently, bonks with o
government sofety net hove on
incentive to toke on greoter risks.
with toxpoyers poying the bill if the
bonk subsequently goes bonkrupt.
Another similor problem with the
public sofety net is the 'too
importont to foil' ond the 'too
mony to foil'syndromes. Becouse
the foilure of o very lorge bonk
mokes it more likely thot o mojor
finonciol disruption will occur,
bonk regulotors ore noturolly
reluctont to ollow o systemicolly
importont bonk to foil ond couse
losses to its depositors. One
problem with this policy is thot it
increoses morol hozord incentives
for big bonks. Becouse on
individuolly systemic institution con
count on public sector support
when it foils, it distorts incentives for
privote risk monogement ond

further reduces the force of
morket discipline (too-importontto foil). ln oddition, finonciol sector
exposures to institutions thot ore
lobelled'too importont to foil' ore
likely to grow substontiolly lorge os

finonciol institutions core

less

obout their exposure to on entity
thot is expected to be supported.
Similorly, if bonks hove on
expectotion thot in the event of on

oggregote weokness of the
finonciol system (mocro-systemic
risk), they con goin public sector
support, it further distorts incentives
ond leod institutions to increose

their exposure to the oggregote
shock-'too mony to foil' (Archoryo
ond Yorulmozer,2007).

2.

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

been successful of protecting
depositors ond preventing bonk This poper hos considered the
ponics, it olso hos serious rotionole for finonciol system

'o Procyclicolif ,'s lhe fendency for some regutotory ond business procfices to mognfy the business cycle fKodres ond
Noroin,2009J.
" Forinstonce, rnonogers ondshoreholders of ofoiledinstitulion do not hove odeguofe rincenlrves io toke into occounf lfre
confogion loses fo olherinstifuftbns ond fhe reol economy.

'' Ihe domino-effecf' ,i fhe phenornenon used lo descdbe fhe spreoding of risb omong ,hrerconnecred

ftnonciolsysfem ondfhesubsequenf exfernolit'es fo thesociely (e.g.Brunnermer'er, eLol,266,9l.
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regulotion ond supervision.

The

'public interest' orgument

represents the most powerful
orgument in fovour of regulotion
ond supervision. Rother thon
ossuming o honds-off position on

the oversight of finonciol
institutions

ond morket octivities,

the cenlrol bonk should increose

its role in guiding finonciol
behoviour olong lines thot
contribute to stobility. The
systemic risk rotionole ond the
fiscol costs of crises justify lhe role
of government intervention.
Regulotion ond supervision ore
olso necessory to protect investors

ond depositors from the

opportunistic behoviour of bonks
ond ensure o stoble, efficient ond

relioble finonciol sector. However,

now been developed by

The

there hove been significont
concerns thot regulotion ond

Bosel Committee on Bonking
Supervision following the lessons

supervision con only reduce (but

leornt from the crisis. These reform

not eliminote) the probobility of

meosures will, omong other

future crises occurTence becouse

things, curtoil both micro-systemic

finonciol innovotion olwoys orises
os o response to regulotion. The
risks inherent in the finonciol
system ore numerous ond cunent
regulotory models (nomely the
Bosel ll fromework) hove foiled to
mitigote such risks, especiolly

mocro-systemic risks thot
hove threotened globol finonciol
stobility. The proposed regulotory
regime will require bonks to hold
more copitolin times of excessive
credit growth to cushion ogoinst
losses in down times. lt will olso
involve more stringent liquidity risk

those posed by excessive
leveroge, illiquidity, low loss
obsorbing copitol ond
securitizotion of ossets which were

ollfoctors thot led to the build-up
of the recent crisis. New
opprooches to regulotion hove

ond

monogement stondords ond
supervisory monitoring os well os

enhonced disclosure on
remunerotion proctices ond offbolonce sheet exposures.

REFERENCES

Archoryo, V ond Yorulmozer,T, (2OO7),'Too mony to foil - on onolysis of time-inconsistency in bonk
closure policies', Journol of Finonciol lntermediotion, I 6, pp, 1 -3 1
Bonk for lnternotionol Settlements (19971, Core Principles for Effective Bonking Supervision, Bosel,
Switzerlond : Bonk f or lnternotionol Settlements

Bonk for lnternotionol Settlements (2006), Core Principles for Etfective Bonking Supervision,
Consultotive Documenl Bosel, Switzerlond: Bonkfor lnternotionolSettlements
Bonk for lnternotionol Settlements (201 0), Bosel Committee's response to the finonciol crisis: report
the G20, Bosel, Switzerlond: Bonk for lnternotionol Settlements

to

Borth, J,, Coprio, G,, ond Levine, R. (2006), "Rethinking Bonk Regulotion, Till Angels Govern",
Combridge University Press.
Brunnermeier, M., Crockett, A,, Goodhort C,, Persoud, A, ond Shin, H. (2009) 'The Fundomentol
Principles of Finonciol Regulotion', Genevo Reports on the World Economy, no I lnternotionol
Center for Monetory ond Bonking Studies,

I

Centrol Bonk of Nigerio (20.l0) Finonciol Stobility Report Jonuory 2OO9 - June 20.l0, Moiden Edition,
CBN,Abujo

Clement

P (2010) The

term 'mocro-prudentiol': origins ond evolution,

BIS

Quoderly Review Morch;

pp.59-67

" Even uninsured deposltors fwhose deposils ore for in excess of fhe govemmentl deposif insuronce limit) ore less likely to
monilorlhe bonkondenforce morketdiscipline becouse fheybelieve fhe govemrnentwillinterveneinthe event of foilure,
f urther strengthening fhe'foo importont to foil' syndrome.

23

I

Volume 35, No.

OCTOBER

4

_ DECEMBER

Diomond, W, ond Dybvig, H, (.l983) 'Bonk Runs, Deposit lnsuronce, ond Liquidity', Journol of
PoliticolEconomy, Vol, 9.l, No 3
Engelen, E,, Erturk, 1,, Froud, J,, Leover, A,, ondWillioms, K, (2009),'Reconceptuolising Finonciol
lnnovotion: Frome, Conjuncture ond Bricologe, Future of Finonciol Regulotion Conference,
Glosgow Morch 30 & 3l

Finonciol Services Authority (2009) The Turner Review: A Regulotory Response to the Globol
Bonking Crisis

Hening, R. ond Sontomero, A.(.1999) Whot is Optimol Finonciol Regulotion? Finonciol
lnstitutions Center, TheWhorton School, Universityof Pennsylvonio, Philodelphio

lnternotionol Monetory Fund, Finonciol Stobility Boord ond Bonk for lnternotionol Settlements
(2009), Guidonce to Assess the Systemic lmportonce of Finonciol lnstitutions, N/orkets ond
lnstruments: lnitiolConsiderotions, Woshington, lnlernotionol Monetory Fund
Kodres, L, ond Noroin, A. (2009), Whot is to be Done', Lessons of the Finonciol Crisis for Future
Regulotion of Finonciol lnstitutions ond Morkets ond for Liquidity Monogement' llt/F's Finonce

ond Development Morch, pp,23-26
Loeven, L. ond Volencio,

F,

(2008) Systemic Bonking Crises: A New Dotobose, ltvlF Working

PoperWP/O81224

Llewellyn, D, (.l999) The Economic Rotionole for Finonciol Regulotion, Occosionol Poper
London, FSA
Mothews,
ond Sons

K,,

1,

ond Thompson, J, (2008) 'The Economics of Bonking,' Second Edition, John Wiley

Nier, E,W (20.l I ), Mocro-prudentiol Policy - Toxonomy ond Chollenges, Notionol lnstitute
Economic Review No 2.l6: Rl -Rl5
Quinn, B, (2009) Lecture Notes on 'Finonciol Sector Stobility ond Growth', University of Glosgow
Business School
Spong, K, (2000), 'Bonking Regulotion: lts Purposes, lmplementotion ond Effects', Sth Edition,
Federol Reserve Bo nk of Konsos City, Konsos City, M issouri
Stigler, G. 11971), 'The Theory of Economic Regulotion', The Bell Journol of Economics ond
Monogement Scienc e, 2(1 ), 3-21
Stiglitz, J. (1994), Whither Sociolism

(Combridge, MA:

MIT Press)

White, E. (2005),'The Evolution of Bonking Regulotion in Twentieth CenturyColombio', mimeo,
Rutgers University

24

20I

I

